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Introduction
The law and economics literature makes an important distinction between de jure and de facto judicial independence (de jureJI and defactoJI). It seems straightforward to assume that increases in the former will be followed by increases in the latter. However, findings in the scarce empirical literature are not so straightforward. Using cross-sectional data, Hayo and Voigt (2007) find that dejureJI and defactoJI are positively related and that dejureJI is the single most important predictor for defactoJI. However, the magnitude of this relationship is small. Melton and Ginsburg (2014) report that none of the conventional variables used to proxy dejureJI are significantly correlated with defactoJI. Indeed, a figure in their paper (2014, 189) suggests that defactoJI might even cause dejureJI to adjust, instead of the other way around as commonly assumed.
In this paper, we tackle this issue from a different perspective. Although it is interesting to compare differences in dejureJI and defactoJI across countries, the lack of a time dimension makes inferences problematic. Here, we use panel data analyses to study the long-term relationship between dejureJI and defactoJI over 50 years and across 50 countries. This investigation is possible due to the development of time-based indicators for dejureJI and defactoJI. Voigt (2014, 2016) use and extend the Comparative Constitutions Project (Elkins et al. 2009 ) and derive a time-varying indicator for dejureJI based on factor analysis; Linzer and Staton (2015) come up with a latent variable measurement model combining eight extant indicators to map out defactoJI across time. In the latter's context, missing data are a big problem and they deal with it by employing Bayesian methodology.
Combining these two variables in one dataset, we generate the largest possible balanced panel with a length of 50 years , which, coincidentally, contains 50 countries too. Note that the sample is not representative of the world, as more than one third of the countries became OECD members before 1973 and some regions are not adequately covered. See the Appendix for a list of the countries and summary statistics.
The Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and defactoJI
We commence our analysis by running a static random effects panel data regression, where we use dejureJI to explain defactoJI. 1 Model 1 in Table 1 shows a significantly negative relationship between the two variables, which is in stark contrast to the theoretical view in the literature. A one standard deviation increase in dejureJI is associated with a 0.13 standard deviations decrease of defactoJI and the average marginal elasticity is -0.08. Thus, the absolute size of the effect is quite small, suggesting that the linkage between the two variables is weak. This result is in line with Melton and Ginsburg's (2014) conclusion. The preceding conclusions assume that both variables are stationary or at least cointegrated.
Panel unit roots have very weak power and, thus, a long time series is essential for valid inference. This is one of the reasons why we restrict the sample to countries with 50 years of data. Table 2 studies the time-series behaviour of our dataset. Employing various tests, we find clear evidence of non-stationarity. The cointegration tests suggest that the variables are cointegrated, at least for most of the panels. This finding leads us to compute error-correction terms (EC) based on the results from Table   1 . Accounting for the potentially dynamic nature of the relationship of interest, we run EC models using the first difference of the JI variables and employing five lags. The outcome in Table 3 shows that the ECs are highly significant in all specifications. Thus, the relationships estimated in Table 1 appear to be long-term equilibria, deviations from which affect defactoJI's short-term adjustment in a stabilising way. Finally, we analyse whether the causal relationship might run from defactoJI to dejureJ, as suggested by the figure in Melton and Ginsburg (2014, 189) . We use a VAR-type setup (Johansen 1992) to test for weak exogeneity of defactoJI with regard to dejureJI. None of the tests reject the null of weak exogeneity (see Table 3 ), which supports the view that defactoJI adjusts to dejureJI and not the other way around. Moreover, we find no evidence of Granger-causality running from defactoJI to dejureJI.
Conclusion
Using two recently published new indicators for defactoJI and dejureJI, we study their longterm relationship as well as their short-term dynamics. In contrast to the theoretical view in the extant literature, we find that the relationship between the two variables is negative and weak in terms of magnitude, in line with findings by Melton and Ginsburg (2014) . In our sample, the negative relationship holds only for OECD countries, whereas we discover a positive relationship outside of the OECD. Employing a different methodology, Gutmann and Voigt (2018) report a similar finding for EU countries.
We find evidence of cointegration between the two variables, which, according to the EngleGranger representation theorem (Engle and Granger 1987) , can be interpreted as the existence of long-term equilibria. In the case of the OECD countries, we observe different dynamics: the long-term relationship is negative, but short-term changes in dejureJI positively affect changes in defactoJI. Finally, we discover no evidence of reverse causality, i.e., that dejureJI is influenced by defactoJI.
